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In this provocative synthesis, Ben Elman argues for the enduring significance of
science, technology, and medicine in China from late imperial to modern times. Like
other modern historians, he explicitly links abstract science with technologies for
handling nature and the human body, and roots intellectual history in broader social
trends. This is not a specialized history of science in China, but a world history of
China with scientific characteristics. Anyone looking for a concise summary of the
best recent scholarship on science in China should start here.
Drawing heavily on his longer monograph, In Their Own Terms: Science in China,
1550–1900, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2005), Elman surveys
four major periods of scientific and technological development: the encounter with
the Jesuits in the late sixteenth to seventeenth centuries, the lesser-known eighteenth
century, the Protestant impact of the nineteenth century, and the period of self-
strengthening up through the aftermath of the Sino–Japanese war. He ranges over
many fields of investigation, paying attention to astronomy, biology, botany, car-
tography, manufacturing, mathematics, medicine, and military technology.
Most Chinese and Western readers probably still believe that, with a few excep-
tions, Confucian literati of the imperial age ignored the investigation of nature, and
that China failed to initiate a scientific revolution because of this neglect. Elman
avoids the unanswerable question of why China did not have the world’s first
scientific revolution. Instead, he emphasizes active interaction by literati with the
Westerners who brought modern science to China. They showed great curiosity
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about new discoveries and inventions. They eagerly acquired and published new
astronomical theories, and they collected mechanical clocks.
He also stresses that the Westerners who brought the scientific revolution to
China, both the Jesuits and the nineteenth-century Protestant missionaries,
deliberately put on blinders, filtering Western advances through religious screens.
Jesuits, under orders from the Pope, concealed the prominence of the heliocentric
model of the planetary system, instead promoting the compromise of Tycho Brahe,
which still put the earth at the center, but placed the other planets orbiting the sun.
Chinese interested in modern astronomy thus only received a partial view of the new
science. Protestants likewise equivocated when they discussed Darwin, upholding a
natural theology tradition which masked the destructive implications of natural
selection. Western literati themselves, embedded in Christian theology, made
strenuous efforts to accommodate disturbing advances in investigation of nature
within traditional frames. It is no surprise that the Chinese did the same. What stands
out from Elman’s account is the flexibility and dynamism of the Chinese tradition of
“investigation of things.”
Joseph Needham, of course, made a powerful argument for the diversity and
richness of the classical Chinese tradition of investigation of nature, but he mainly
discussed the period before the Jesuits arrived. He aimed to fit Chinese achievements
within a fixed model of scientific disciplines and to show that Chinese scholars
anticipated discoveries of modern science. Needham’s scheme of scientific disciplines
is now outdated, and by repeatedly stressing Chinese anticipation of modern Western
discovery, he pushed out of shape his other determined effort to see Chinese science on
its own terms. For all his encylopedic knowledge, Needham’s social analysis of the
roots of Chinese science, unfortunately, was never nuanced. Elman greatly improves
on Needham by describing global social and political contexts for important Chinese
scientific developments. Good-bye to “bureaucratic feudalism!”
Elman also shows that, contrary to the argument of Derk Bodde, the classical
Chinese language posed no obstacles to the introduction of modern mathematical
terminology. Instead, the mathematical tradition absorbed many Western techniques.
Likewise, herbal manuals and medicinal texts could accept Western anatomy
without putting great stress on it. Since Western surgical techniques had no obvious
advantages over Chinese herbalism until the end of the nineteenth century, the
Chinese medical tradition could assert its autonomous validity. When China’s
southward expansion exposed new settlers to virulent tropical diseases, physicians
debated proper treatment for “heat factor disorders” that differed from classical
descriptions. Without adopting a germ theory, they responded to the presence of new
diseases. By the end of the nineteeth century, Xu Shou called for critical reexami-
nation of the medical tradition and selective incorporation of Western techniques.
Syncretism, not obscurantism, marked much of classical China’s response to
Western science and technology through the end of the nineteenth century.
Elman argues that the self-strengthening movement had notable successes, and
that science and technology promoted at the arsenals and dockyards often surpassed
that of Japan. Only the Japanese victory in 1895 made self-strengthening look like a
failure. But Japan’s victory came from superior organization, not from superior
technology. Japan threw its entire nation into the war, while the commander of
China’s southern fleet, who had already engaged the French in the South, reserved
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his resources for southern defense. China’s bigness, not its traditional civilization,
was its greatest weakness.
Chapter 3, on manufacturing and trade, addresses indirectly the issue of the
Industrial Revolution. Elman portrays vividly the advances of Chinese artisanal work
in porcelain, glass making, and printing. He shows that Chinese eagerly took up
manufacture of European clocks when the emperors indicated an interest in them, but
the “Newtonian revolution” of mathematically based empirical investigation reached
China very late. Elman recognizes that the great sophistication of Chinese
manufacturing calls into question the “European-dominated story of the rise of
modern techno-science” (p. 98), but he seems to agree with certain economic and
intellectual historians who argue that the production of “useful and reliable
knowledge” (URK) based on scientific investigation was the key to Europe’s
pioneering advances in coal and steam-powered industrialization. These scholars try
to link the entire European intellectual tradition from Newton to the Enlightenment
directly to the Industrial Revolution. Elman writes that “the steam engine linked
Newtonian merchanics and engineers in a cycle of manufacturing and industrial
advances that soon led to the the efficient use of natural deposits of fossil fuels and thus
an unprecedented amount of new energy for practical work in factories, arsenals, and
on ships.” (p. 93) But he neglects to mention the important Chinese production of
URK in the statecraft school of scholars, who wrote insightful essays about mining,
agricultural yields, water conservancy, currency, and taxation: in short, the political
economy of agrarian development. I think the case is yet to be proven that abstract
Newtonian knowledge really had a serious direct impact on European industrializa-
tion, and in any case China had its own kind of URK if not in Newtonian form.
Pomeranz’s material explanation for the “Great Divergence” of the nineteenth century
is more convincing than arguments for defects in Chinese intellectual abilities.
The catastrophe of the Sino-Japanese war, however, discredited nearly all of the
achievements of the previous three centuries, leading to radical attacks on tradition
and violent erasure of the past. These totalistic dismissals of imperial China’s
scientific and technological achievements erased much valuable historical knowl-
edge and threw China into uncritical adulation of the West. Needham attacked
Western historians for their biases, but neglected to note that Chinese themselves
held even more fervent Orientalist views of their own past as stagnant and worthy
of rejection.
Only now, as China reenters a global economy from a position of strength, having
rejected radical revolution in favor of reform, has space opened up for new
understanding of imperial China’s distinctive path to modernity. The rich “blending
of natural learning that occurred from 1600 to 1900” (p. 226) needs serious attention
from scholars and readers who want informed perspectives on China in the
contemporary world.
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